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Abstract
The introduction of ¯rm size into labor search models raises the question how wages
are set when average and marginal product di®er. We develop and analyze an alternative
to the existing bargaining framework: Firms compete for labor by publicly posting long{
term contracts. In such a competitive search setting, ¯rms achieve faster growth not only
by posting more vacancies, but also by o®ering higher lifetime wages that attract more
workers which allows to ¯ll vacancies with higher probability, consistent with empirical
regularities. The model also captures several other observations about ¯rm size, job °ows,
and pay. In contrast to bargaining models, e±ciency obtains on all margins of job creation
and destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The planner solution allows
a tractable characterization which is useful for computational applications.
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Search models of the labor market have traditionally treated the production side very simplis-
tically: Either a ¯rm has only one job, or large ¯rms operate with constant marginal product,
which is usually equivalent.1 While successful in many dimensions, these models are silent about
all aspects that relate to employer size, even though ¯rm size and ¯rm dynamics are important
for wages, job °ows and aggregate employment.2
To capture the implications of ¯rm heterogeneity in size, age and productivity, a large body of
recent work has introduced multi{worker ¯rms with decreasing returns to scale into standard la-
bor search models.3 Most current contributions rely on a combination of random search together
with bilateral bargaining between the ¯rm and each individual worker without commitment over
future wages. While this might be viewed as the analogue of standard one{worker{one{¯rm
bargaining for multi{worker settings, it raises several concerns: First, due to random search the
probability of ¯lling a job is independent of ¯rm growth, while in the data there is a strong pos-
itive relationship indicating that ¯rms grow by ¯lling vacancies faster and not only by posting
more vacancies (see Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010)). Second, due to the absence of
commitment, existing workers in growing ¯rms experience a decline in wages since their bar-
gained wage depends upon marginal product which falls as the ¯rm extends employment. Third
and related to the previous point, precisely this decline in wages induces ¯rms to hire ine±ciently
many workers (Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Smith (1999)). Excessive hiring is due to a within{¯rm
externality: When a ¯rm hires another worker, the decline in marginal product decreases the
wages that existing workers obtain in the bargaining process. This is very di®erent from the
standard case with constant marginal product4 where the ¯rm{worker pair takes jointly e±cient
decisions, and e±ciency of overall vacancy creation is a matter of the bargaining power. Indeed,
many researchers have focused on decentralizations of the planner's solution (e.g., Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996) and Shimer (2005b)).5 With decreasing returns there has been no similar
1For surveys see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
2For example, larger ¯rms are more productive, they pay more, and they have lower job °ow rates (e.g., Oi
and Idson (1999)), Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)); younger ¯rms have higher exit rates and pay higher
wages (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010), Brown and Medo® (2003)); and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2009) ¯nd that small and large ¯rms contribute to the business cycle in di®erent ways.
3A subset of this work considers, for example, unemployment and e±ciency (Bertola and Caballero (1994),
Smith (1999), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2006), Mortensen (2009)), labor and product market regulation (Koeniger
and Prat (2007), Ebell and Haefke (2009)), business cycles (e.g., Elsby and Michaels (2010), Fujita and Nakajima
(2009)), and international trade and its labor market implications (Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)).
4Pissarides (2000) notes that the standard search and matching model is compatible with decreasing returns
to labor if the production function has constant returns in multiple inputs, and the other inputs such as capital
can be adjusted instantaneously. In this case the marginal return of labor, after accounting for adjustment of the
other factors, is in fact constant (see also Cahuc and Wasmer (2001)).
5Hosios (1990) showed that e±ciency requires a bargaining power equal to the elasticity of the job{¯nding
1focus due to the current perception that e±ciency cannot be obtained in decentralized equilib-
rium, irrespective of the workers' bargaining power; ine±ciencies arise because each individual
¯rm employs too many workers so as to depress the wages of its existing workforce.
This work proposes and characterizes an alternative framework to think about ¯rm dynamics
in a frictional labor market. Firms can commit to long{term wage contracts, and can publicly
post these contracts in order to attract unemployed workers (competitive search). Commitment
allows ¯rms to o®er wage policies that are independent of the hiring of other workers, which
remedies within{¯rm externalities. Posting introduces a competitive element into the labor
market. Since workers can choose which contract to search for, those ¯rms that want to hire
faster raise the attractiveness of their o®er in order to induce more workers to apply for the job.
Posting and administering additional vacancies becomes increasingly costly, partially due to the
fact that recruitment takes up time of the existing workers (e.g., Shimer (2010)), leading to a
slow buildup of the workforce over time.
This view of the hiring process generates equilibrium outcomes that are very di®erent in
positive and normative implications from the ones under bargaining described above. For one,
the ability to post contracts means that ¯rms ¯ll their vacancies at di®erent speeds depending on
the wages that they o®er, generating a connection between ¯rm growth rates and job-¯lling rates.
Moreover, commitment implies that wages do not need to fall as a ¯rm grows larger (wages stay
constant in our baseline model in Section 3). Finally, these factual implications on ¯rm dynamics
are indeed socially optimal: A social planner would choose the same path of job °ows for each
of the ¯rms. E±ciency arises also in the presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity
shocks. Multi{worker ¯rms create and destroy jobs e±ciently both on the extensive margin of
¯rm entry/exit and on the intensive margin of ¯rm expansion/contraction. The fact that ¯rms
can commit eliminates the intra{¯rm externalities, and the ability to publicly post contracts leads
to inter{¯rm optimality via a modi¯ed Hosios condition. This suggests a plausible environment
where a decentralized market achieves e±ciency despite decreasing returns to scale and labor
market frictions, giving a justi¯cation for the study of the planner's solution and a benchmark
against which to judge actual labor market outcomes. In this respect, our work extends the
ideas of the competitive theory of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) to an environment with a
frictional labor market.
We show analytically that the qualitative properties exhibit many of the empirical connec-
tions between ¯rm size, growth and pay. We also demonstrate the applicability of this theory
in a calibrated example and show that the model replicates several relevant cross{sectional rela-
tionships. It captures the negative relation between ¯rm size and job °ows on the extensive as
well as the intensive margin, as well as the distribution of employment across ¯rms with di®erent
rate, which is assumed in these papers. Others have left the bargaining power a free parameter to be assessed as
part of the calibration strategy (e.g., Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)).
2growth rates. We also ¯nd that wages are positively correlated with ¯rm size and ¯rm growth.
Faster{growing ¯rms indeed generate more hires through both higher job{¯lling rates and more
vacancy postings.
One major advantage of this theory is that it provides tractability not only in steady state
but also in the presence of business{cycle shocks. This is due to the fact that entry of new ¯rms
renders the ¯rms' policy functions independent of the ¯rm distribution. They depend only on
the ¯rm's productivity, its current workforce, and on the aggregate state. This substantially
reduces the state space, making it feasible to compute the model without the need to resort to
approximation techniques, such as those of Krusell and Smith (1998), that have been applied in
the heterogeneous{¯rm search models of Elsby and Michaels (2010) and Fujita and Nakajima
(2009) to analyze aggregate labor market dynamics.
The tractability is related in spirit but di®erent in technique and implications from the
notion of block recursivity introduced by Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2009, 2010). In our
environment, and in contrast to theirs, ¯rms are not indi®erent between contracts, matching
rates for di®erent contracts are not pinned down by a free{entry condition, and most contracts
are o®ered only by a small subset of the existing ¯rms. Nevertheless, existing ¯rms compete for
workers with new entrants, and workers choose to apply to either new or existing ¯rms, which
gives rise to an aggregate arbitrage condition. If ¯rms always enter, this arbitrage ties the hiring
of existing ¯rms to the hiring of entrant ¯rms and takes out the dependence on the prevailing
¯rm distribution.6 Importantly, while the ¯rms' policy functions are independent of the ¯rm
distribution, aggregate labor{market variables such as the workers' job{¯nding rate crucially
depend on mix between new and old ¯rms. This feature introduces a sluggish response of the
job{¯nding rate to aggregate shocks, which has been documented in the data (e.g. Fujita and
Ramey (2007)). In standard labor search models, the job{¯nding rate is a jump{variable which
is perfectly correlated with aggregate productivity.
The basis for this work is the notion of competitive search developed for one{worker{per{
¯rm models by, e.g., Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999a,b), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2001), Shimer (2005a), Eeckhout and Kircher
(2010). One original motivation for competitive search was to link ¯rm characteristics such as
pro¯tability and capital{labor ratios to hiring rates and wages (e.g., Montgomery (1991)), but
initial work was only able to talk about di®erent jobs, lacking a notion of ¯rm size. Our work
de¯nes a ¯rm by its production function. It retains the idea that ¯rms o®er higher life{time
wages when they want to ¯ll a vacancy faster. They can also post more vacancies to increase their
numbers of hires, yet ¯rms' capacity to create more vacancies is limited, for example because
6This is similar to the setup in Menzio and Moen (2010), even though it is otherwise very di®erent in that they
restrict attention to two{period{lived ¯rms with linear production and some lack of commitment. We provide
more intuition for our aggregate arbitrage condition in Section 4.2.
3recruitment takes up labor which makes job creation increasingly expensive. As ¯rms have
di®erent recruitment tools on hand, they use both higher wages and more vacancy postings to
achieve faster growth. We characterize the dynamics of the workforce adjustment in this setting,
and establish a non{trivial positive relation between productivity and vacancy{¯lling rates.7
E±ciency on the extensive margin of ¯rm entry has long been established in competitive
search with one worker per ¯rm, yet e±ciency on the intensive margin of output per ¯rm has
not been as conclusive: For example Guerrieri (2008) introduces an intensive margin through
moral hazard and ¯nds e±ciency in steady state but not out of steady state. We show that in
our model e±ciency on all margins obtains in and out of steady state.8
After a brief review of further related literature, especially Hawkins (2006) and Schaal (2010),
we ¯rst present in Section 3 a simpli¯ed setup without aggregate or idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. This allows for a teachable representation, it establishes the most important insights for
dynamics of employment, job{¯lling rates and wage o®ers, and it demonstrates the e±ciency of
the decentralized allocation. In Section 4, we lay out the notationally more complex analysis
that takes account of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, we prove the equivalence between
the e±cient and the decentralized allocations, and we characterize them using our aggregate
arbitrage condition. Beyond the focus on these theoretical contributions, we consider a calibrated
numerical example in Section 5 to illustrate the workings of the model and to point at its potential
to capture the connections between ¯rm dynamics and the labor market. We conclude in Section
6 with a discussion how risk aversion and worker heterogeneity might be introduced into this
framework.
2 Further Related Literature
In the labor search literature with large ¯rms operating under decreasing returns to scale, lack
of commitment to future wages has been the prevailing assumption. Our contribution, alongside
contemporaneous contributions by Hawkins (2010) and Schaal (2010), is the ¯rst to introduce
long{term contracts in a search setting where ¯rms face decreasing returns.
In the existing work, three features generate the intra{¯rm externalities mentioned above:
lack of commitment, bilateral bargaining, and random search. If instead the ¯rm either bargains
about long{term contracts at the ¯rst time it meets a worker (Hawkins (2010)) or if it bargains
multilaterally with a union comprising all workers at once (Bauer and Lingens (2010)) it can
7The proof of this relationship is non{trivial in our setting as it relies on value functions being supermodular
in ¯rm size and productivity, which does not follow from standard arguments.
8 On an intuitive level, the main di®erence to Guerrieri (2008) is that future unemployment rates do not have
unpriced externalities on current productivity.
4overcome this within-¯rm externality such that the ¯rm and its workers take jointly e±cient
decisions taking the rest of the labor market as given. Nevertheless, these recent contributions
point out that in neither case the market achieves overall e±ciency. With long{term bargaining,
¯rms still grow too big under convex vacancy costs: Large ¯rms have small marginal product
relative to the average ¯rm on which they induce externalities by posting vacancies. This means
that the social bene¯t of vacancy postings at large ¯rms is smaller, so that e±ciency would require
them to obtain a smaller share of the surplus which is not possible with a single bargaining power
parameter (unless vacancy costs are linear, or unless vacancies are posted in di®erent submarkets
resembling a competitive search setup). With union bargaining, there is a hold{up problem since
¯rms' job{creation costs are sunk at the time of bargaining, generating too little job creation on
the intensive margin.
Competitive search dispenses with bargaining weights and generates a surplus split through
explicit competition for labor. Its micro{foundations usually combine Betrand{style contract
posting with coordination frictions: sometimes multiple workers apply for the same job and
only one of them can be hired (e.g. Peters (1991), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Galenianos
and Kircher (2010)). These micro{foundations can be extended to a multi{worker ¯rm setting
if one assumes that excess applicants for one position cannot ¯ll another position at the same
¯rm. This arises if di®erent vacancies relate to di®erent quali¯cations: for example, vacancies
for an electrician cannot be ¯lled by applicants for the position of a mechanic or a carpenter,
even though each position yields roughly the same contributions in terms of marginal product
(therefore labor input is modeled homogeneously). An alternative interpretation is that workers
are literally identical and excess capacity can be substituted from one job to another, which
means that posting additional jobs exhibits increasing returns; see Burdett, Shi, and Wright
(2001), Hawkins (2006) and Lester (2010) for variations along these lines. In accordance with
most work on large ¯rms, we adopt the ¯rst interpretation and abstract from possible increasing
returns in hiring.
Hawkins (2006) considers a one{shot competitive search model with multi{worker ¯rms and
concave production. He assumes that ¯rms employ ¯nitely many workers after receiving a
stochastic number of applications. Since the number of applicants is stochastic, he shows that
posting a wage alone is not su±cient to induce e±ciency. Rather, the posted contract has
to condition on the realized number of applicants. These contingencies make the model quite
complicated, and results on e±ciency and ¯rm dynamics out of steady state are missing.
All worker °ows in our model are transitions between unemployment and employment. Work
following the lines of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2010), Shi (2009), Menzio and Shi (2009, 2010), Garibaldi and Moen (2010)
and recently Schaal (2010) focused additionally on worker °ows between ¯rms. Except for the
last contribution, ¯rm size in these models is not restricted by the operated technology, though,
5circumventing considerations induced by the di®erence between average and marginal product.9
Closely related to our contribution is the work by Garibaldi and Moen (2010) who also consider
a competitive search model with heterogeneous ¯rms, deriving a number of new insights for on{
the{job search. As they assume constant{returns in production, the only determinant of ¯rm
size arises from convex vacancy creation costs, which are assumed to be independent of ¯rm size
or productivity. By implication, the current size of the ¯rm ceases to be a state variable, and
therefore ¯rm growth and wages depend only on the productivity type but are independent of
¯rm size. That is, their model is silent about the role of ¯rm size and age for job creation; it
also abstracts from idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks.10
A major tractability result is achieved in Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2009, 2010): They
show that under free entry matching rates do not depend on the distribution of workers across
jobs. In particular, in equilibrium ¯rms are exactly indi®erent regarding which contract to
post. This technique extends to our setup only in the special case where recruitment costs are
linear: Then all ¯rms share the same preferences over which contracts to o®er independently
of their size or growth.11 Schaal (2010) uses this insight to allow for on{the{job search with
heterogeneous ¯rms based on the techniques of Menzio and Shi (2009). The drawback of the
¯rms' indi®erence is that ¯rm characteristics are not linked to the contracts it o®ers, implying for
example that ¯rm growth is not linked to job{¯lling rates or to the life-time wages o®ered. Firms
immediately jump to their optimal size without dynamic adjustment. Further, the job{¯nding
rate for unemployed workers is a jump variable, perfectly correlated with aggregate productivity
and independent of the ¯rm distribution. In our work, in contrast, ¯rms face limitations to
expand the workforce by posting more vacancies, so that they have to rely on posting higher
wages if they want grow fast. They are no longer indi®erent between contracts, and job{¯lling
rates are linked to ¯rm characteristics. Furthermore, many important aggregate variables, such
as unemployment and job{¯nding rates, do depend on the ¯rm distribution, which induces a
sluggish response to business{cycle shocks. The reason is that unemployed workers search for
jobs both at existing and at new ¯rms, the hiring rates between these ¯rms di®er, and the mix
between new and existing ¯rms varies over time.
In further relation to the random{search multi{worker{¯rm models mentioned in the intro-
duction, it is worth pointing out that current applied work on business cycles only focuses on the
intensive margin of hiring by considering a ¯xed number of ¯rms (Elsby and Michaels (2010),
Fujita and Nakajima (2009)). Similarly, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007) assess business
9Mortensen (2009) develops a model with on{the{job{search, decreasing{returns production functions, random
search and Stole{Zwiebel wage bargaining.
10Productivity shocks might induce some ¯rms to shed some of their workforce. We note that a linear frontier
such as in Garibaldi and Moen (2010) would imply that a ¯rm that ¯res some workers will ¯re all of them, unless
there are strictly convex ¯ring costs.
11See equation (4) in Section 3 and its discussion for the formal argument.
6cycle implications for a ¯xed number of ¯rms, assuming zero bargaining power for workers. Our
paper addresses additionally the entry and exit of ¯rms, and this feature is in fact decisive to
obtain a tractable solution. The problem that bargaining might introduce unwarranted ine±cien-
cies by assumption has also spurred other solutions than ours. For example, Veracierto (2008)
and Samaniego (2008) consider general{equilibrium versions of the Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) model with frictionless labor markets and competitive wage setting. These approaches
eliminate involuntary unemployment altogether. Veracierto (2009) introduces unemployment in
an adaptation of the Lucas{Prescott island model that includes recruitment technologies. In
contrast, competitive search allows the market to operate through decentralized wage setting,
which attracts workers that optimally choose between search markets and are matched according
to a standard matching function.
3 A Stationary Model of Firm Creation and Firm Growth
3.1 The Environment
The model is set in discrete time and is stationary; that is, there are neither idiosyncratic nor
aggregate shocks. These will be introduced in Section 4.
Workers and Firms
There is a continuum of workers and ¯rms, and workers are negligibly small relative to
¯rms. That is, every active ¯rm employs a continuum of workers.12 The mass of workers is
normalized to one. Each worker is in¯nitely{lived, risk{neutral, and discounts future income
with factor ¯ < 1. A worker supplies one unit of labor per period and receives income b ¸ 0
when unemployed. On the other side of the labor market is an endogenous mass of ¯rms. Firms
are also risk neutral and have the same discount factor ¯. Upon entry, the ¯rm pays a set{up cost
K > 0 and draws productivity x with probability ¼0(x) from the ¯nite set x 2 X. In this section,
productivity stays constant during the life of the ¯rm. In each period, a ¯rm produces output
xF(L) with L ¸ 0 workers, where F is a twice di®erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave function satisfying F 0(1) = 0. Firms die with exogenous probability ± > 0 in which
case all its workers are laid o® into unemployment. Furthermore, each employed worker quits
the job with exogenous probability s ¸ 0. Thus, workers' separation probability is exogenous at
´ ´ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ s).
12 Although the set of individuals has the same cardinality as the set of ¯rms, it is helpful to think of the set
of ¯rms as a closed interval in IR, and the set of workers as a two{dimensional subset of IR
2. When both sets are
endowed with the Lebesgue measure, an active ¯rm employs a continuum of workers, albeit of mass zero.
7Recruitment
Search for new hires is a costly activity. A ¯rm with current workforce L that posts V
vacancies incurs recruitment cost C(V;L;x). An often used benchmark is the case where ¯rms
pay some monetary recruitment cost C(V;L;x) = k(V ) that is strictly increasing and strictly
convex, but independent of the current size or productivity (for applications of this speci¯c
case, see e.g. Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007), Koeniger and Prat (2007), Garibaldi and
Moen (2010)). The convexity captures adjustment costs that prevent the ¯rm from immediately
growing large just by posting many vacancies. A deeper micro{foundation for the convexity arises
when recruitment costs are in terms of labor rather than goods, as proposed in Shimer (2010).
This naturally leads to strictly convex costs even if the inputs into recruitment are linear. For
example, if each vacancy costs c ¸ 0 units of output but also requires h > 0 units of recruitment
time from existing workers, then the total recruitment costs C(V;L;x) = xF(L)¡xF(L¡hV )+
cV , comprising lost output and pecuniary costs, are strictly convex.13 Taking no stance on either
speci¯cation, we allow recruitment costs of the form C(V;L;x) = xF(L) ¡ xF(L ¡ hV ) + k(V )
with at least one of the inequalities h ¸ 0 and k00(V ) ¸ 0 strict. Our results can be extended
to other cost functions as long as they obey the concavity and cross-partial restrictions that we
outline in the proofs and that arise naturally for this speci¯cation.
Search and Matching
A recruiting ¯rm announces a °at °ow wage income w to be paid to its new hires for the
duration of the employment relation. The assumption that the ¯rm o®ers the same wage to all
its new hires is no restriction. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that it is pro¯t maximizing
for the ¯rm to post vacancies with identical wages at a given point in time.14 Further, because
of risk neutrality, only the net present value that a ¯rm promises to the worker matters. Flat
wages are one way of delivering these promises.15
There is no search on the job. Unemployed workers observe the vacancy postings and direct
their search towards wages promising the highest expected lifetime income. In the tradition
of the competitive search literature, each worker decides which submarket (w;¸) to search in,
13 Clearly no more workers can be engaged in hiring than are present at the ¯rm already. To get the hiring
process started, we therefore need to assume that a newborn ¯rm is endowed with some initial workforce Le (e.g.,
the entrepreneurs) who can undertake the initial hiring or production. In this case the production function is
de¯ned on the interval L 2 [¡Le;1); and recruitment activities of any ¯rm are then constrained by its labor
endowment: hV · L + Le.
14 An intuition for this result is provided in the discussion of equation (4) below.
15This is a theory of the present value of o®ered wages. The implementation through constant wages might
be viewed as the limiting case of risk-neutral ¯rms and risk-averse workers, as risk-aversion vanishes. But other
payment patterns are conceivable. Section 4.4 is more explicit about this, and discusses how various notions of
commitment can be relaxed.
8where a submarket is indexed by wage w and unemployment{vacancy ratio ¸.16 The latter is
an equilibrium object that depends on how attractive this wage is relative to the other wages
that are o®ered. In any of these submarkets, unemployed workers and vacant jobs are matched
according to a constant{returns matching technology, and the associated wage is paid every
period that the worker is employed. The matching probabilities depend on the unemployment{
vacancy ratio ¸: a vacancy is matched with a worker with probability m(¸) and a worker ¯nds
a job with probability m(¸)=¸. The function m is di®erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and it satis¯es m(0) = 0 and m(¸) · min(1;¸) for all ¸ 2 [0;1). In particular, this
means that a market that attracts more workers per vacancy induces higher matching rates for
the ¯rms and lower matching rates for workers.
As discussed in the previous section, we follow most of the literature by assuming that
each vacancy has its independent matching rate. Then the law of large numbers convention
together with the assumption that workers are small relative to ¯rms ensures that ¯rms know
with certainty that they hire m(¸)V workers when they post V vacancies in some submarket
with worker{job ratio ¸.17
Timing
Every period is divided into four stages. First, new ¯rms are created and draw their produc-
tivity. Second, production and search activities take place. Third, vacancies and unemployed
workers are matched, and a fraction s of workers leave their ¯rm. And fourth, a share ± of ¯rms
dies. Newly hired workers may never work (and receive no wage income) in the unlucky event
that their employer exits the market at the end of the period.
3.2 Equilibrium
Given that there are no aggregate shocks, we characterize a stationary equilibrium where a
constant number of ¯rms enters the market in every period and where the workers' reservation
wage is constant over time.
Workers' Search Problem
In a stationary environment, a worker who is looking for a job in a particular submarket
in one period is willing to search in that submarket in every period. Consider a worker who is
16Following most of the literature, workers are restricted to search in only one submarket per period. Galenianos
and Kircher (2010) and Kircher (2009) allow for search in multiple submarkets, and even though results di®er,
there are large segments of wages in which the market essentially resembles the restricted one-submarket search
models.
17 Note that we view each vacancy as a separate job requiring individual skills. See the discussion on increasing
returns to hiring in Section 2.
9always searching for a job in a submarket characterized by wage w and unemployment{vacancy
ratio ¸: Within this market the worker follows a simple sequential search process which has been
analyzed extensively going back to McCall (1965). Standard arguments give rise to the following
equation determining the workers' reservation wage:18
R = b + ¯
m(¸)
¸
(w ¡ R) 1 ¡ ±




This means that the reservation wage equals the current period payo® from unemployment
together with an option value from searching, denoted by ½. The search value is the probability
of ¯nding a job to the next period multiplied with the worker's job surplus, which is the present
discounted value of °ow gains w ¡ R.
Workers have a choice which submarket they want to search in. In equilibrium all markets
have to deliver the same search value ½. If a market would be more attractive than others, then
more workers would join that market and drive up the unemployment{vacancy ratio, making the
market less attractive. Similarly, if a market is less attractive than others and still has ¸ > 0;
workers would leave this market, reducing the unemployment{vacancy ratio and making this
market more attractive. Therefore, when workers choose between all combinations (w;¸) 2 ­
where ­ is the set of equilibrium submarkets, all markets have the same search value ½ if they
attract applicants. Rearranging means that (w;¸) 2 ­ has to ful¯ll
w = R + ¸
m(¸)
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)
1 ¡ ± ½ whenever ¸ > 0 : (2)
This condition says that a ¯rm can only recruit workers when its wage o®er matches the workers'
reservation wage plus a premium which is needed to attract workers into a submarket with job{
¯nding probability m(¸)=¸. This premium is increasing in ¸. This is a crucial insight. If a ¯rm
wants to attract more workers per vacancy in order to ¯ll its vacancy at a faster rate, it has to
o®er a higher wage. This means that wages are always monotonically related to the job-¯lling
rate. The relationship between worker-job ratios and wage o®ers is standard in the competitive
search literature (e.g., Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b)).
Firms' Recruitment Policy
Let Jx(L;W) be the pro¯t value of a ¯rm with productivity x, an employment stock of L
workers and a commitment to a total wage bill of W. An entrant ¯rm's pro¯t value is then
Jx(0;0). The ¯rm's recruitment choice involves deciding the number of posted vacancies V as
18Bellman equations for employed and unemployed workers are W = w + ¯[(1 ¡ ´)W + ´U] and U = b +
¯[m(¸)¸¡1(1 ¡ ±)W + (1 ¡ m(¸)¸¡1(1 ¡ ±))U]. Equation (1) follows with R = (1 ¡ ¯)U.
10well as the submarket where these vacancies are posted, characterized by the tuple (w;¸). Its




xF(L) ¡ W ¡ C(V;L;x) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)J
x(^ L; ^ W) ; (3)
s.t. ^ L = L(1 ¡ s) + m(¸)V ; ^ W = W(1 ¡ s) + m(¸)V w ;
¸ ¸ 0; V ¸ 0 ; and condition (2) :
The ¯rst line re°ects the value of output minus wage and hiring costs, plus the discounted
value of continuation with an adjusted workforce and its associated wage commitment. The
second line captures that employment next period consists of the retained workers and the new
hires. For the wages, since separations are random they reduce the wage bill proportionally, and
new commitments are added for the new hires. The last line connects the o®ered wage to the
worker{vacancy ratio through the workers' search problem.
The solutions to problem (3) are characterized by one intra{temporal and one inter{temporal
optimality condition, equations (4) and (5) below, that we derive in the Appendix (proof of
Proposition 1). We also show that the ¯rm's recruitment strategy is independent of past wage
commitments and can be described by two policy functions: ¸x(L) denotes the number of ap-
plicants that a ¯rm of size L and productivity x wants to attract per vacancy. This directly
determines the wage it has to post according to (2). Given a choice of ¸, the ¯rm decides on the
number of number of posted vacancies. We denote this policy function by V x(L;¸).
The intra{temporal optimality condition describes the choice between the two recruitment
tools of the ¯rm within a period: the number of posted vacancies V on the one hand, and the
worker{job ratio ¸ (and thus the posted wage w) on the other:
C1(V;L;x) ¸ ¯½m(¸) ¡ ¸m
0(¸)
m
0(¸) ; V ¸ 0 ; (4)
with complementary slackness. This condition can be derived by minimizing the sum of recruit-
ment costs and wage costs conditional on the requirement of hiring a given amount H = m(¸)V
of workers this period. The left{hand side gives the marginal cost of posting one more vacancy.
When a ¯rm posts more vacancies, it can lower its wage o®er and the associated hiring rate while
keeping the total number of hires constant. The net present value of wage savings are represented
by the right{hand side, an increasing function of ¸. From the assumptions on C follows that
the left side is (weakly) decreasing in L and strictly increasing in V . Hence the implicit solution
to this equation yields the policy function V =V x(L;¸) which is increasing in ¸ and (weakly)
increasing in L. Intuitively, with higher ¸ the probability to ¯ll a vacancy increases, and hence
the ¯rm is willing to bear higher marginal recruitment costs by advertising more jobs. And with
higher L, marginal recruitment costs fall and hence the ¯rm is inclined to post more vacancies.
Clearly, if costs are linear in vacancies and independent of the other variables, then the optimal
11job{¯lling rate according to (4) is independent of any ¯rm or size characteristics. In that case
the model loses the connection between the desire to expand and the attractiveness of the job
o®ers that are posted, because any adjustment can be achieved through vacancy creation on
which there are no bounds even for the smallest ¯rms. Equation (4) also provides an intuition
why it is never optimal for a ¯rm to o®er di®erent wages at a given point in time: the ¯rm
compares the wage costs against the vacancy costs, and there is a unique value that balances
this trade-o®.
The inter{temporal optimality condition describes how the ¯rm grows over time. For a ¯rm
which hires in the current and in the next period (¸; ^ ¸ > 0), we obtain the Euler equation
xF










Here ^ L, ^ V , and ^ ¸ are next period's values of employment, vacancy postings and worker{job ratio.
Since next period's employment and vacancy creation are fully determined by the worker{job
ratios in this and the next period (through (4) and the ¯rst constraint in (3)), this condition
links the worker{job ratio and the related hiring rate inter-temporally. The left{hand side of
this equation captures the marginal bene¯t of a higher workforce in the next period. If this
is high, then the ¯rm rather hires more workers now than to wait and hire them next period.
This is captured by the right{hand side, which is increasing in the current worker{job ratio but
decreasing in next period's worker{job ratio. In particular, this means that a more productive
¯rm wants to achieve fast growth by o®ering a more attractive contract, thus raising the worker{
job ratio and the job-¯lling rate.
The following proposition and its corollaries provide comparative statics results for the job{
¯lling rate and the growth rate of ¯rms. The job{¯lling rate is linked to the earnings o®er, so
that these comparative statics carry over to the o®ered net present value of wages to new hires.
These characterization results depend crucially on the supermodularity of the value function,
which renders this proof non{trivial. While standard techniques (Amir (1996)) can be applied
when the cost function is independent of ¯rm size and productivity, this is no longer true in the
more general setting.
Proposition 1: For any value ½ > 0, the ¯rm's value function Jx(L;W) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in L, increasing in x, strictly supermodular in (x;L), and continuous and
decreasing in ½. The ¯rm's policy functions are independent of wage commitments W. For
a hiring ¯rm the policy function ¸x(L) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in L.
Posted vacancies V x(L;¸) are increasing in L and strictly increasing in ¸.
Proof: Appendix.
Since these results hold for any search value ½, they also apply when this value is determined
in general equilibrium. These results directly imply
12Corollary 1: Conditional on size, more productive ¯rms pay higher wages and have a higher
job{¯lling rate. Conditional on productivity, younger (and smaller) ¯rms pay higher wages and
have a higher job{¯lling rate.
In the Appendix, we also prove
Corollary 2: If parameter h in the recruitment technology is su±ciently small, more pro-
ductive ¯rms have a higher growth rate, conditional on size; and larger ¯rms have a lower growth
rate, conditional on productivity.
A useful illustration how ¯rms grow over time can be provided in a special case. Consider a
¯rm with productivity x that enters in some period ¿. Its job creation policy is then described
by a sequence (Lt;¸t;Vt)t¸¿ starting from L¿ = 0. Posted vacancies Vt = V x(Lt;¸t) are the
implicit solution of equation (4). The employment stock accumulates according to
Lt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Lt + m(¸t)V
x(Lt;¸t) : (6)
In the example with recruitment cost C(V;L;x) = xF(L)¡xF(L¡hV )+cV , equations (5) and












0(¸t) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)
i
: (7)
In Lemma 3 of the Appendix, we show that this equation has a unique steady state ¸¤ > 0 if
recruitment costs are low enough, and ¸t converges to ¸¤ from any initial value ¸¿ > 0. Figure
1 shows the phase diagram for the system (6) and (7). The curve where the employment stock
is constant (Lt = Lt+1) is downward sloping since (4) implies that V x(L;¸)=L is increasing in
L. If the condition
xF




holds, there exists a unique stationary employment level L¤ > 0. The corresponding dynamics
imply further that there is a downward{sloping saddle path converging to the long{run employ-
ment level. Graphically, the ¯rm's policy function ¸x(L) traces this saddle path.
It follows from these considerations that the ¯rm's recruitment policy is characterized by
a path of declining wage o®ers and job{¯lling rates along the transition to the ¯rm's long{
run employment level. Concavity of the ¯rm's production function implies that the ¯rm wants
to spread out its recruitment costs across several periods. This statement remains true for
other forms of the recruitment technology. Only when recruitment costs are linear in vacancies,
C(V ) = cV , the ¯rm would choose a constant ¸¤ (and hence post the same wage in all periods).
In that case, it would immediately jump to its optimal size by recruiting L¤ workers in the entry
period and then keep the employment level constant. As soon as recruitment costs are strictly
convex, such a policy is not optimal, and it may not be feasible due to the capacity constraint
13Figure 1: The ¯rm's optimal recruitment policy follows the declining saddle path.
on labor input in recruitment. A further insight of this example is that the stationary ¯rm size
depends positively on x: a more productive ¯rm grows larger and o®ers higher lifetime wages on
its transition to the long{run employment level.
Firm Creation
No entrant makes a positive pro¯t when the expected pro¯t income of a new ¯rm equals the
entry cost, that is, X
x2X
¼(x)J
x(0;0) = K : (8)
This condition implicitly pins down the worker's job surplus ½ and therefore, via the ¯rm's
optimal recruitment policy, worker{job ratios in all submarkets. In a stationary equilibrium, a
constant mass of N0 ¯rms enters the market in every period, so that there are Na = N0(1 ¡ ±)a




a)a¸0 be the employment/recruitment path for a




a unemployed workers are searching for jobs in the same submarket where this ¯rm
searches for workers, o®ering wage wx
a. Therefore, the mass of entrant ¯rms N0 is uniquely













a ] : (9)
14This equation says that the unit mass of workers is either employed or unemployed.
General Equilibrium
We now de¯ne a stationary equilibrium with positive ¯rm entry. When K is large enough,
there may also be an uninteresting equilibrium without ¯rms which is ignored in the following.













(a) Unemployed workers' job search strategies maximize utility. That is, the reservation wage








a )a¸0 describes the ¯rm's growth path, obtained from the policy functions solving
problem (3).
(c) There is free entry of ¯rms, equation (8).
(d) The number of entrant ¯rms is consistent with aggregate resource feasibility, equation (9).
Since ¯rms' behavior has already been characterized, it remains to explore equilibrium exis-
tence and uniqueness.
Proposition 2: A stationary competitive search equilibrium exists and is unique. There is
strictly positive ¯rm entry provided that K is su±ciently small and F 0(0) is su±ciently large.
Proof: Appendix.
It is worthwhile to brie°y summarize some cross{sectional implications of our theory. Dif-
ferent ¯rms in the equilibrium cross{section (x;L) have di®erent recruitment and wage policies.
Corollaries 1 and 2 point out that job{¯lling rates and ¯rm growth rates depend positively on x
and negatively on L. Hence, when recruitment time input h is small enough, ¯rm growth rates
correlate positively with job{¯lling rates. Such a relationship has been documented by Davis,
Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) who ¯nd that ¯rms that grow faster do so through a higher
job{¯lling rate on top of expanding the number of vacancies. Furthermore, since job{¯lling rates
relate directly to the earnings of new hires, the two corollaries also imply that faster{growing
¯rms o®er higher lifetime wages. Belzil (2000) documents such patterns after controlling for size
15and worker characteristics; he shows that wages, particularly those of new hires, are positively
related to a ¯rm's job creation. Lastly, a well established fact in labor economics is the positive
relationship between size, productivity and pay (e.g., Brown and Medo® (1989), Oi and Idson
(1999)). In our model, wages of new hires depend positively on x and negatively on L. Since
more productive ¯rms grow larger, a positive wage{size relation emerges in our model if the
dispersion in productivity is large enough.19 Moreover, such a relation also obtains if su±ciently
many ¯rms are close to their long{run employment level (which happens if the exit rate ± is rather
low): Among those ¯rms with nearly constant employment, the larger (and more productive)
¯rms need to hire more to keep their workforce constant. Therefore, among the cross{section of
established ¯rms the larger ones o®er higher life-time wages.20
3.3 E±ciency
The social planner decides at each point in time about ¯rm creation, job creation and worker{
job ratios in di®erent submarkets of the economy. The planner takes as given the numbers of
¯rms that were created in some earlier period, as well as the employment stocks of all these




where Na is the mass of ¯rms of age a ¸ 1, and Lx
a is employment of a ¯rm with productivity x
and age a. It is no restriction to impose that all ¯rms of a given type (a;x) are equally large.
The planner maximizes the present value of output net of opportunity costs of employment and
net of the costs of ¯rm and job creation. With ^ ¾ to denote the state vector in the next period,
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The last condition is the economy's resource constraint. It states that the mass of of all individ-
uals that are attached to some ¯rm of type (a;x), either as workers Lx
a or as unemployed workers
19We note that enough productivity dispersion is also required in random{search models with bargaining, and
even more so because wages of all workers decline in a growing ¯rm. In our model with wage commitment, more
productive ¯rms have grown faster in the past, and hence pay higher lifetime wages to their existing workers.
20Equations (4) and (5), evaluated at the stationary employment level, imply that V and ¸ are positively
related (provided that k00 > 0). It follows that the worker{job ratio increases in the number of hires m(¸)V .
16queuing up for a job at this ¯rm ¸x
aV x
a , may not exceed one. We say that a solution to problem
(10) is socially optimal.
Proposition 3: The stationary competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof: Appendix.
The e±ciency of equilibrium can be linked to a variant of the well-known Hosios (1990)
condition. It says that e±cient job creation requires that the share of the surplus that ¯rms get
upon matching with a worker is equal to the elasticity of the job-¯nding rate with respect to the
job{worker ratio 1=¸ (which is one minus the elasticity of m). For a hiring ¯rm (V > 0;¸ > 0) we












1(^ L; ^ W) ¡ R
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)
o
:
This equation compares the marginal cost of a vacancy on the left{hand side to the marginal
bene¯t on the right{hand side. The term in squared brackets captures the surplus share accruing
to the ¯rm, and the last terms capture the expected discounted total surplus of a vacancy. With
probability m(¸)(1 ¡ ±), the vacancy is ¯lled and survives to the next period. The term in
curly brackets represent the marginal surplus of a ¯lled job, which is the di®erence between
the expected discounted marginal increase in net output, Jx
1(^ L; ^ W), and the discounted value
of the worker's opportunity cost for the duration of the job. Overall, the equation states that
¯rms create vacancies exactly to the point where their marginal bene¯t coincides with the value
speci¯ed by the appropriate Hosios condition for large ¯rms.21
4 Productivity Shocks and Firm Dynamics
We now extend the previous model to include both idiosyncratic (¯rm{speci¯c) and aggregate
productivity shocks. This extension allows us to explore not only two margins of job creation
(¯rm entry and ¯rm growth), but also the two margins of job destruction (¯rm exit and ¯rm
contraction). Output of a ¯rm with L workers is xzF(L) where x 2 X is idiosyncratic produc-
tivity and z 2 Z is aggregate productivity. Both x and z follow Markov processes on ¯nite state
spaces X and Z with respective transition probabilities ¼(x+jx) and Ã(z+jz). An entrant ¯rm
pays ¯xed cost K and draws an initial productivity level x0 2 X with probability ¼0(x0). For a
¯rm of age a ¸ 0, let xa = (x0;:::;xa) 2 Xa+1 denote the history of idiosyncratic productivity,
21See also the derivation of the Hosios condition in a bargaining context in Hawkins (2010).
17and let zt = (z0;:::;zt) be the history of aggregate shocks at time t. Write Ã(zt) and ¼(xa) for
the unconditional probabilities of aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity histories.
We assume that an active ¯rm incurs a ¯xed operating cost f ¸ 0 per period. This parameter
is required to obtain a non{trivial exit margin.22 In this section we are as agnostic as possible
about the recruitment cost function; we only assume that C is strictly increasing and convex in
posted vacancies. Firms exit with exogenous probability ±0 ¸ 0 which is a lower bound for the
actual exit rates ± ¸ ±0. Similarly, workers quit a job with exogenous rate s0 ¸ 0 which provides
a lower bound for the actual separation rates s ¸ s0.23
The timing within each period is as follows.24 First, aggregate and idiosyncratic produc-
tivities are revealed, new ¯rms enter, and all ¯rms decide about separations and exit. Second,
¯rms decide about recruitment, and recruiting ¯rms are matched with unemployed workers. An
unemployed worker who has just left another job (due to ¯rm exit, quit or layo®) can search
for reemployment within the same period. And third, production takes place. In the following,
we ¯rst describe the planning problem before we show its equivalence to a competitive{search
equilibrium in Section 4.4.
4.1 The Planning Problem
The planner decides at each point in time about ¯rm entry and exit, layo®s and job creation,
as well as worker{job ratios in di®erent submarkets. In a given aggregate history zt, we denote
by N(xa;zt) the mass of ¯rms of age a with idiosyncratic history xa. Similarly, L(xa;zt) is the
employment stock of any of these ¯rms. At every history node zt and for every ¯rm type xa,
the planner decides an exit probability ±(xa;zt) ¸ ±0, a separation rate s(xa;zt) ¸ s0, vacancy
postings V (xa;zt) ¸ 0, and a worker{job ratio ¸(xa;zt) for the submarket in which vacancies of
that ¯rm are matched with unemployed workers.25 The numbers of ¯rm types change between
22 A non{trivial exit margin could also obtain in the presence of ¯ring costs when f = 0.
23 Although this model ignores many important worker °ows, such as those between jobs and the °ows in and
out of the labor force, parameter s0 also represents a measure of exogenous worker turnover, as in Fujita and
Nakajima (2009).
24The timing is slightly di®erent from the previous section. With shocks arriving at the start of the period, it
seems more sensible to allow ¯rms to exit right after the shock, and also to allow workers to immediately ¯nd
reemployment after separations have taken place. In the previous section, the di®erent timing clearly distinguishes
between the current recruitment costs and the future bene¯ts in production. The characterization and e±ciency
results can be proven for either environment.
25 To save on notation, we do not allow the planner to discriminate between workers with di®erent ¯rm tenure.
Given that there is no learning-on-the-job, there is clearly no reason for the planner to do so. Nonetheless, the
competitive search equilibrium considered in 4.4 allows ¯rms to treat workers in di®erent cohorts di®erently,
which is necessary because ¯rms o®er contracts sequentially and are committed to these contracts. See the proof
of Proposition 6 for further elaboration of this issue.
18periods t ¡ 1 and t according to
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and the employment stock at any of these ¯rms adjusts to
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To simplify notation, we de¯ne L(xa;zt) ´ [1 ¡ s(xa;zt)]L(xa¡1;zt¡1) as the employment stock
after separations and before recruitment, which is an argument of the ¯rm's recruitment cost
function C(V;L;x).
At time t = 0, the planner takes as given the numbers of ¯rms that entered the economy in
some earlier period, as well as the employment stock of each of these ¯rms. Hence, the state
vector at date 0, prior to the realization of productivities, is summarized by the initial ¯rm
distribution (N(xa¡1;:);L(xa¡1;:))a¸1;xa¡12Xa. In a given history zt, the planner also decides the
mass of new entrants N0(zt) ¸ 0, so that
N(x0;z


































subject to the dynamic equations for N and L, namely (11), (12) and (13), and subject to the















· 1 : (15)
This constraint says that the labor force (employment plus unemployment) cannot exceed the








are the workers that are employed in some ¯rm after separations have taken place. The remaining
part of the sum are unemployed workers queueing up for employment in one of the active
¯rms posting V (:) vacancies in submarkets with worker{job ratios ¸(:). For instance, there are
N(xa;zt) active ¯rms with productivity history xa, each of which posts V (xa;zt) vacancies that
meet ¸(xa;zt)V (xa;zt) unemployed workers in a particular submarket. We summarize a solution
to the planning problem by a vector (N;L;V;¸;s;±), with N = (N(xa;zt))a;t¸0 etc.
194.2 Characterization of the Planning Solutions
There is a convenient characterization of a planning solution which says that exit, layo®, and
hiring decisions follow a recursive equation at the level of the individual ¯rm. Let ¯tÃ(zt)¹(zt) ¸
0 be the multiplier on the resource constraint (15) in history node zt. Intuitively, ¹(zt) is the
social value of a worker in history zt. Let Gt(L;x;zt) denote the social value of an existing ¯rm
with employment stock L, idiosyncratic productivity x and aggregate productivity history zt.






xztF(^ L) ¡ b^ L ¡ ¹(z










s.t. ^ L = (1 ¡ s)L + m(¸)V ;
± 2 [±0;1]; s 2 [s0;1]; ¸ ¸ 0; V ¸ 0 :
The interpretation of these equations is rather straightforward. The planner wants a ¯rm with
characteristics (L;x) to stay active in aggregate history zt whenever the term in braces is non{
negative, otherwise he sets ± = 1. The term in braces gives the value of an active ¯rm. In
the current period, this value encompasses the ¯rm's output net of the opportunity cost of
employment, net of ¯xed costs and recruitment costs, and net of the social cost of workers tied
to the ¯rm in this period; these workers include those that are retained from the previous period,
namely (1 ¡ s)L, and also ¸V unemployed workers who aim to ¯nd a job at the ¯rm (of which
m(¸)V · ¸V eventually ¯nd a job).
Proposition 4:
(a) For given multipliers ¹(zt), there exist value functions Gt : IR+ £X £ Zt+1 ! IR, t ¸ 0,
satisfying the system of recursive equations (16).
(b) If X = (N;L;V;¸;s;±) is a solution of the planning problem (14) with multipliers ¹ =




t) · K ; N0(z
t) ¸ 0 (17)
is satis¯ed for all zt. Conversely, if X solves for every ¯rm problem (16) with multipliers ¹,
and if condition (17) and the resource constraint (15) hold for all zt, then X is a solution
of the planning problem (14).
20Whilst Proposition 4 is a useful characterization of planning solutions, it cannot be applied
for computational purposes. The di±culty is that the multipliers ¹(zt) are non{stationary and
depend on the initial ¯rm distribution. However, a much more powerful characterization can be
obtained under the provision that ¯rm entry is positive in all states of the planning solution, so
that the ¯rst inequality in (17) is binding. When this is the case, the ¯rm{level value functions
and the social value of a worker are independent of the ¯rm distribution. This is our aggregate{
arbitrage property, which we discuss in the introduction and which relates to the concept of
block recursivity introduced by Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2009, 2010).
To gain intuition for the independence from the distribution of existing ¯rms, envision only
a single period. The planner can assign unemployed workers either to existing ¯rms or to new
¯rms. If there are many existing ¯rms, there are fewer workers left to be assigned to new ¯rms.
Nevertheless, the social value of any worker that is assigned to a new ¯rm does not change: Each
new ¯rm has an optimal size, and if less workers are assigned to new ¯rms, then proportionally
less new ¯rms will be created, leaving the marginal value of each worker unchanged. Therefore, as
long as any new ¯rms are created, e±cient hiring by existing ¯rms requires their marginal social
bene¯t of hiring to be equal to the social bene¯t at the new ¯rms. This logic extends to the case
with many periods. A new ¯rm today may also hire workers tomorrow, but its marginal social
bene¯t of tomorrow's hires has to equal the marginal bene¯t of hiring at tomorrow's new ¯rms,
which depends on the next aggregate state but is again independent of the ¯rm distribution.
Thus, the social value of assigning a worker to any ¯rm is tied to the social bene¯t created at
new ¯rms which depends on the aggregate state alone. While this ensures that job creation and
destruction policies of individual ¯rms are independent of the distribution of existing ¯rms, the
¯rm distribution does matter for the dynamics of aggregate labor market variables, such as the
workers' job ¯nding probability: If there are more existing ¯rms, then more of the workers queue
for their jobs and obtain a di®erent probability of getting hired.
To see the independence of value functions from the ¯rm distribution formally, suppose there
are n aggregate states zi, i = 1;:::;n, and let ¹ = (¹1;:::;¹n) 2 IR
n
+ be a vector of social
values in these states. Let Gi(L;x;¹) be the social value of a ¯rm with employment stock
L, idiosyncratic productivity x and aggregate productivity zi, for i = 1;:::;n. G = (Gi) :




+ satisfy the Bellman equations
G
i(L;x;¹) = max(1 ¡ ±)
(
xziF(^ L) ¡ b^ L ¡ f ¡ ¹i[(1 ¡ s)L + ¸V ] (18)






j(^ L; ^ x;¹)
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;
where maximization is subject to the same constraints as in problem (16). Positive entry in all




i(0;x;¹) = K : (19)
This characterization of planning solutions by (Gi;¹i)i=1;:::;n is particularly helpful for numerical
applications. Despite considerable ¯rm heterogeneity, the model can be solved by a recursive
problem on a low{dimensional state space (18) and the (simultaneous) solution of a ¯nite{
dimensional ¯xed point problem (19). Importantly, the distribution of ¯rms is irrelevant for
this computation. After the corresponding policy functions have been calculated, the actual
number of entrant ¯rms N0(zt) is obtained as a residual of the economy's resource constraint
in a simulation of the model, and thus it does depend on the distribution of existing ¯rms.
Therefore, the evolution of aggregate employment, output and job °ows depend on the ¯rm
distribution as well.
Although it cannot be guaranteed that the planning solution has positive entry in all state
histories, in quantitative applications this possibility should not be relevant. Analytically, we
prove that any solution of (18){(19) which gives rise to positive entry in all state histories
coincides with a solution to the planner's problem. We also ¯nd that a unique solution of these
equations exists for small aggregate shocks.
Proposition 5:
(a) Suppose that a solution of (18) and (19) exists which de¯nes an allocation X = (N;L;V;¸;s;±)
satisfying N(zt) > 0 for all zt. Then X is a solution of the planning problem (14).
(b) If K, f, and b are su±ciently small and if z1 = ::: = zn = z, equations (18) and (19) have a
unique solution G(L;x;¹) with ¹1 = ::: = ¹n. Moreover, if the transition matrix Ã(zjjzi)
is strictly diagonally dominant and if jzi ¡ zj is su±ciently small for all i, equations (18)
and (19) have a unique solution.
4.3 Recruitment and Layo® Strategies
The reduction of the planning solution to problem (18) permits a straightforward characterization
of the optimal layo® and hiring strategies. A ¯rm with productivity x and employment stock L
should dismiss workers (that is, s > s0) in state i = 1;:::;n i®
xziF







1(L(1 ¡ s0); ^ x;¹) < 0 : (20)
This expression is the marginal social surplus of a worker at the employment stock L(1 ¡ s0)
after worker turnover. If marginal worker surplus is negative, the ¯rm lays o® some workers until
the marginal worker surplus is nil.
22Conversely, for the ¯rm to recruit workers, it must be that ¸ > 0 and V > 0. In that case,
it follows from the ¯rst{order conditions for ¸ and V that26






As in the previous section, it follows from concavity of m and convexity of C that there is an
increasing relation between the worker{job ratio and the number of posted vacancies at the ¯rm.
With higher ¸, the probability to ¯ll a vacancy increases, and hence the planner is willing to
post more vacancies at higher marginal recruiting cost. Denote the solution to equation (21) by
V = Vi(¸;L;x), which is positive for ¸ > ¸i(L;x). The planner's optimal choice of ¸ for ¯rm
(L;x) in aggregate state i satis¯es
xziF







1(^ L; ^ x;¹) = ¹i
m
0(¸) ;
with ^ L = L(1 ¡ s0) + m(¸)Vi(¸;L;x). Therefore, the ¯rm recruits workers, if and only if
xziF







1(L(1 ¡ s0); ^ x;¹) > ¹i
m
0(¸i(L;x)) : (22)
The two conditions (20) and (22) illustrate how the ¯rm's strategy depends on its characteristics
(L;x). Small and productive ¯rms recruit workers and grow, whereas large and unproductive
¯rms dismiss workers and shrink. Depending on the functional forms of C(:) and m(:), there
can also be an open set of characteristics where ¯rms do not adjust their workforce.27 Similar
patterns for employment adjustment are obtained in the models of Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
and Elsby and Michaels (2010).
4.4 Decentralization
We now describe a competitive search equilibrium and demonstrate that competitive search
gives rise to the same allocation as the planning solution characterized in Proposition 4. Firms
o®er workers a sequence of state{contingent wages, to be paid for the duration of the match.
They also commit to cohort{speci¯c and state{contingent separation probabilities. Contracts
are contingent on the idiosyncratic productivity history of the ¯rm at age k, xk, and on the












26 This equation is straightforward to derive and analogous to (4).
27Such inactivity states exist if marginal adjustment costs are strictly positive; this is either the case when
C1(0;L;x) > 0 or when m0(0) < 1. The latter condition says that matching frictions do not vanish asymptotically
when ¸ ! 0.
23where wa(xk;zt) is the wage paid to the worker in ¯rm history (xk;zt), conditional on the worker
being still employed by the ¯rm in that instant. 'a(xk;zt) ¸ ±0 + (1 ¡ ±0)s0, for k > a, is the
probability of a job separation prior to the production stage in history xk. In the hiring period,
a separation cannot occur, so 'a(xa;zT) = 0 by de¯nition.
The Workers' Search Problem
Let U(zt) be the utility value of an unemployed worker in history zt, and let W(Ca;xk;zt) be
the utility value of a worker hired by a ¯rm of age a in contract Ca who is currently employed























An unemployed worker searches for contracts which promise the highest expected utility, consid-
ering that more attractive contracts are less likely to sign. The worker observes all contracts Ca
and he knows that the probability to sign a contract is m(¸)=¸ when ¸ is the worker{job ratio
in the submarket where the contract is o®ered. That is, potential submarkets are parameterized














Because an unemployed worker gets one chance to search in every period, his Bellman equation
reads as
U(z




A ¯rm of age a in history (xa;zt) takes as given the employment stocks of workers hired in
some earlier period, (L¿)
a¡1
¿=0, as well as the contracts signed with these workers, (C¿)
a¡1
¿=0. The ¯rm
chooses an exit probability ± and cohort{speci¯c layo® probabilities s¿. For these probabilities
to be consistent with separation probabilities speci¯ed in existing contracts, it must hold that
± · '¿(xa;zt) for all ¿ · a¡1, and s¿ = 1¡(1¡'¿(xa;zt))=(1¡±) when ± < 1, with arbitrary
choice of s¿ when ± = 1. The ¯rm also decides new contracts Ca to be posted in V vacancies in
a submarket with worker{job ratio ¸. It is no restriction to presuppose that the ¯rm o®ers only
one type of contract and searches in only one submarket. When Ja is the value function of a




































1 ¡ ± ; ¿ · a ¡ 1 ; (27)


















t) = b + ¯EztU(z
t+1) + ¸½(z
t)
m(¸) when ¸ > 0 : (30)
The last condition is the workers' participation constraint; it speci¯es the minimum expected
utility that contract Ca must promise in order to attract a worker queue of length ¸ per vacancy.




















for all t ¸ 0, a ¸ 0, xa 2 Xa+1, zt 2 Zt+1, 0 · ¿ · a, and for a given initial ¯rm distribution,
such that
(a) Firms' exit, hiring and layo® strategies are optimal. That is, Ja is the value function and
Ca(:), ±(:), ¸(:), and V (:) are the policy functions for problem (26){(30).


















t) ; a ¸ 0 :




t) · K ; N0(z
t) ¸ 0 (31)
holds for all zt, and the number of ¯rms evolves according to (11) and (13).
25(d) Workers' search strategies are optimal, i.e. (½;U) satisfy equations (24) and (25).


















= 1 : (32)
Proposition 6: A competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof: Appendix.
Discussion of Wages and Employment Commitment
It is not hard to see that a wage commitment is su±cient for a ¯rm to implement its desired
policy, even if it cannot commit to separation rates. Given risk neutrality, the ¯rm can set
the wages following any future history exactly equal to the reservation wage which is the sum
of unemployment income and the worker's shadow value b + ¹(zt). It can achieve any initial
transfer to attract workers through a hiring bonus. In this decentralization, the costs of an
existing worker are always equal to his social value in the alternative: unemployment and search
for another job. Since the °ow surplus for any retained worker equals his shadow value, the ¯rm's
problem in this case coincides with the planner's problem (16), so that ¯ring and exiting will
be exactly up to the socially optimal level even though the ¯rm does not commit to separation
rates. Workers do not have any incentive to quit the job unilaterally, either, because they are
exactly compensated for their social shadow value from searching.
Similarly, given employment commitment the wage{tenure pro¯les for individual workers
are arbitrary because of risk{neutrality. As we show in the proof of Proposition 6, ¯rms do
not need to discriminate in separation rates between workers in di®erent cohorts. Nonetheless,
such equilibria are also possible; then workers with higher separation rates will be compensated
through higher wage transfers, whereas workers with more stable jobs earn lower wages. Put
di®erently, this model cannot say anything about individual wage{tenure pro¯les. It only pins
down the surplus split between workers and ¯rms.
In our numerical examples, we consider the benchmark case where wage pro¯les are not
dispersed within the ¯rm. That is, all workers within ¯rm (L;x) in history zt earn the same
°ow wage w(L;x;zt). In a competitive{search equilibrium, such a wage pro¯le can be easily
calculated using (23) and condition (30).
265 A Calibrated Example
We study the implications of this model by calibrating it to the U.S. labor market. The cali-
bration proceeds in two steps. First, we choose model parameters to match selected long{run
features of the U.S. labor market. Second, we feed this model with aggregate productivity shocks
replicating the standard deviation and persistence of empirical labor productivity. For illustra-
tion purposes we adopt as basic a speci¯cation as possible for the ¯rm productivity process and
for the vacancy cost function, even though in their general form they allow substantial additional
degrees of freedom whose exploration might be useful in future applications.
We choose the period length to be one month and set ¯ = 0:996 so that the annual interest
rate is about 5 percent. We assume a CES matching function m(¸) = (1+k¸¡r)¡1=r and set the
two parameters k and r to target a monthly job{¯nding rate of 0.45 (Shimer (2005b)) and an
elasticity of the job{¯nding rate with respect to the vacancy{unemployment ratio of 0.5 which
belongs within the range of reasonable values reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Since we also target the aggregate vacancy{unemployment ratio at 1=¸ = 0:72, we calculate the
parameters k and r to attain the two targets at ¸ = 1=0:72.
Table 1: Parameter choices.
Parameter Value Description Target
¯ 0.996 Discount factor Annual interest rate 5%
k 1.623 Matching fct. scale Job{¯nding rate
r 1.475 Matching fct. elasticity Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
® 0.7 Prod. fct. elasticity Labor share
c 0.1 Vacancy cost parameter Hiring cost 14% of quarterly wage
xmin 0.31 Lowest productivity Firm size (mean relative to min)
¼ 0.65 Transition probability Job{creation rate
b 0.2 Flow value of leisure Vacancy{unemployment ratio = 0.72
K 13.09 Entry cost Job creation at opening ¯rms
f 0.6 Flow operating cost Job destruction at closing ¯rms
±0 0.0011 Exogenous exit rate Job destruction at closing large ¯rms
s0 0.02 Quit rate Monthly quit rate
The production technology is Cobb{Douglas with xL® and a simple Markov process for id-
iosyncratic productivity. Particularly, we let idiosyncratic productivity attain one of ten equally
distant values in the range [xmin;1], uniformly drawn upon entry. The transition process is
such that idiosyncratic productivity changes from one month to the next with probability ¼ and
27switches to a neighboring state with identical probabilities. Parameter ® is set to 0.7 which gives
rise to a labor share of 2/3.The parameters xmin and ¼ are chosen to match two targets. Given
that labor is a continuous variable in our model, we identify the labor input of one worker with
the minimum ¯rm size in the sample distribution, and we target the ratio between the mean ¯rm
size and the minimum ¯rm size at 21.6, which is the average number of workers per ¯rm in the
Business and Employment Dynamics (BED) data set of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Second, we target quarterly ¯rm{level rates of job creation and job destruction of around 6.5%
which is the average in BED data for the period 1990{2005, see Helfand, Sadeghi, and Talan
(2007).
We deliberately choose a quadratic vacancy cost function C(V ) = cV 2 and we set parameter
c so that recruiting cost per hire are about 14 percent of quarterly wage income, following Hall
and Milgrom (2008) and Elsby and Michaels (2010). We set the opportunity cost of employment
(parameter b) to target a vacancy{unemployment ratio of 0.72 which is the number chosen by
Pissarides (2009), based on the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). We set
the entry cost parameter K and the operating °ow cost parameter f to target the extensive
margins of job creation and job destruction. Based on BED data between 1990 and 2005, 16.6%
of all quarterly job gains occur at opening ¯rms and 17.2% of all job losses occur at closing
¯rms (see Helfand, Sadeghi, and Talan (2007)).28 With this choice of parameters, all ¯rms with
the lowest idiosyncratic productivity x = xmin leave the market, whereas all others stay. By
implication, only the smallest ¯rms (those at the lowest four productivity levels) can make a
transition to the lowest productivity state (and thus leave the market) from one quarter to the
next. Nonetheless, in BED data 0.33 percent of jobs are lost at ¯rms whose employment is larger
than mean employment (i.e. 20 workers or more). Hence we set the exogenous monthly exit rate
at ±0 = 0:0011 to account for job destruction at exiting larger ¯rms. The exogenous worker quit
rate is set at s0 = 0:02, which is roughly the monthly quit rate in JOLTS (Davis, Faberman,
and Haltiwanger (2006)). Table 1 summarizes these parameter choices.
Due to the non{linearity of the model, we cannot match all targets exactly, but the ¯t is
rather close (see Table 2). The job{¯nding rate is a bit lower than the target which is due to
the fact that the matching function is concave and vacancy{unemployment ratios are dispersed
across submarkets.
Figure 2 shows value and policy functions (separations and recruitment policies) for ¯rms in
the nine active productivity states x > xmin. These policy functions con¯rm the insights from
Section 3: conditional on size, more productive ¯rms advertise more vacancies and ¯ll any of
them with a higher rate. And conditional on productivity, smaller ¯rms recruit faster and create
more jobs. The ¯gure also shows that, for any productivity, there is a range of employment
28The respective shares at the establishment level are somewhat larger (20.9% and 20.1%).
28Table 2: Data moments and model statistics.
Variable Data Model
Job-creation rate (quarterly) 6.7% 6.9%
Job-destruction rate (quarterly) 6.3% 6.9%
Labor share 0.67 0.68
Workers per ¯rm 21.6 21.3
Hiring cost (share of quart. wage) 0.14 0.14
Share of JC at openings (quarterly) 16.6% 17.5%
Share of JD at closings (quarterly) 17.2% 16.0%
Vacancy{unemployment ratio 0.72 0.72
Job{¯nding rate (monthly) 45% 44%
Notes: The model statistics are calculated as a stationary ¯rm distribution obtained from a simulation of 10000
entrant ¯rms where each ¯rm is subject to the idiosyncratic shock process and exits at productivity x = xmin.
This gives a total of about 8 ¢ 105 observations.
levels where ¯rms neither shed workers nor recruit new workers, and hence shrink by the natural
turnover s0L.
In a simulated stationary ¯rm distribution, we ¯nd positive relations between ¯rm growth
and the two means of recruitment, vacancy postings and vacancy ¯ll rates. The two relationships
are shown in Figure 3(a) for the vacancy rate (i.e., vacancies as a share of employment) and in
Figure 3(b) for the monthly job{¯lling rate (hires per vacancy). Qualitatively, these graphs
correspond to the ¯ndings of Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) who also document a
positive relationship between employer growth, the monthly vacancy rate and the job{¯lling rate
in JOLTS data. In their study, vacancy postings seem to play a smaller role in accounting for
di®erences in employment growth, whereas they are a more important factor in our simulation.
As discussed earlier, convexity in the recruitment technology is the key factor for a positive
relationship between ¯rm growth and job{¯lling rates; with a linear recruitment technology, this
relationship disappears.29
The model performs reasonably well in matching the dispersion of employment growth
rates across ¯rms. Using the Longitudinal Business Database (1992{2005), Davis, Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, and Miranda (2006) obtain a cross{sectional dispersion (employment{weighted standard
deviation) of annual employment growth rates for continuing ¯rms of 0.37 (see Figure 8 in their
paper). In our simulated stationary distribution, this dispersion measure is somewhat larger
29When we choose a more general function C(V ) = cV a, we con¯rm that di®erences in job{¯lling rates vanish
for values of a close to one. On the other hand, the spread does not become much larger when we choose values
of a greater than two. Hence we decided to simply use a quadratic function.
29Figure 2: The ¯rms' value functions (upper left), and the policy functions for separation rates s
(upper right), for vacancies (lower left), and for job{¯lling rates m(¸) (lower right).
at 0.44. Table 3 also shows that the model does a good job in matching the distribution of
employment growth rates.
Because our calibration of idiosyncratic productivity does not target the cross{sectional em-
ployment distribution, it does not replicate the large variance and skewness of the ¯rm{size
distribution. Nonetheless, when we rank ¯rms along the percentiles in the employment distri-
bution, the model reproduces the negative relation between ¯rm size (as measured by the rank
in the size distribution) and rates of job creation and job destruction, and it also captures the
negative relation between ¯rm size and the rates of job creation and destruction at the extensive
margin; see Figure 5.
We can also compare wages between ¯rms, using the wage pro¯les where all workers within
a ¯rm earn the same. We ¯nd that wage dispersion across ¯rms is rather small, with a standard
deviation of log wages equal to 3.6%, in line with other work that abstracts from on-the-job search
30(a) Vacancy rate (b) Job-filling rate
Figure 3: Vacancy rates (vacancies relative to employment) and job{¯lling rates (monthly hires
per vacancy) across ¯rm growth rates. Notes: The curves are calculated from a simulated ¯rm distribution
with 8¢105 observations and 20 equally spaced intervals of the ¯rm growth distribution, with ¯rm growth de¯ned
as 2(Lt ¡ Lt¡1)=(Lt¡1 + Lt).
Table 3: Distribution of employment growth
Growth rate interval Data Model








2 (entry) 0.7 0.61
Notes: The table reports employment shares for intervals of quarterly employment growth rates. The empirical
distribution is taken from Table 2 of Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger, and Rucker (2008). The model statistics are
calculated from a stationary ¯rm distribution with 8 ¢ 105 observations.
(see e.g. Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2009)). The model does link wage dispersion to ¯rm
size and ¯rm growth. For instance, the wage di®erence between ¯rms with log employment one
standard deviation above average to those with log employment one standard deviation below







Figure 4: Quarterly job creation and job destruction rates (total and extensive margins) across
¯rm sizes (percentiles of the employment distribution). Notes: The dashed curves are based on the
nine reported ¯rm{size classes in the BED. The solid curves are calculated from a simulated ¯rm distribution
with 8 ¢ 105 observations and 20 equally spaced intervals of the employment distribution. When ¯rms change
size classes, job °ows are attributed according to the dynamic{size allocation of the BLS (see Moscarini and
Postel{Vinay (2009)).
di®erential between wages at ¯rms that grow by more than 20 percent and those that do not
grow or shrink is 6.7 percent (almost two standard deviations).
To explore the impact of aggregate shocks, we ¯rst compute the model's impulse response
to a permanent productivity increase. We ¯nd that our model accounts for a sluggish response
of labor market aggregates. In a reduced{form vector autoregression, Fujita and Ramey (2007)
show that the vacancy{unemployment ratio is much more persistent than labor productivity
and that productivity shocks propagate gradually to market tightness and employment. Fujita
and Ramey (2007) and Shimer (2005b) argue that standard search and matching models cannot
replicate this pattern because market tightness is a jump variable which correlates perfectly with
aggregate productivity. Our model with heterogenous ¯rms and convex recruitment costs yields
some propagation of unemployment and vacancies. Figure 5 shows the impulse response to a
permanent one{percent increase in aggregate labor productivity. As higher productivity makes
entry more attractive, wages must rise su±ciently to balance the gains from entry to its cost.
We ¯nd that the reservation wage rises by 1.4% (and hence by more than productivity) which
implies that optimal ¯rm size falls, which induces a larger number of ¯rms to enter. The impact
response to the productivity and wage increase is that existing ¯rms shed some of their workers
so that unemployment rises in the ¯rst quarter.30 Over time, however, more and more ¯rms
30The impact response of unemployment would be dampened or even reversed if entry costs increase together
32enter and vacancies rise gradually to a higher level, following a hump{shaped pattern. After the
¯rst three months, unemployment sluggishly declines to a permanently lower level. Figure 5(c)
also shows that the job{¯nding rate responds only gradually to the aggregate productivity shock.
After the initial decline (due to the rise in unemployment), the job{¯nding rate takes about a
year to adjust to the permanently higher level. We emphasize again that this sluggish response is
entirely driven by the convex recruitment costs at the ¯rm level. With linear vacancy costs, the
job ¯nding rate would immediately jump to its new steady{state level.31 This result is di®erent
from Elsby and Michaels (2010) who obtain a less sluggish response of the job{¯nding rate in a
random search model with linear recruitment costs. It also crucially di®ers from the competitive
search model with linear vacancy costs of Schaal (2010) who ¯nds that the job{¯nding rate is a
jump variable.
To study the model's business cycle properties, we presuppose that entry is positive in all
periods and solve the model as explained in Section 4.2. Aggregate productivity attains ¯ve
equally distant values in the interval [zmin;2 ¡ zmin], and the Markov process for z is a mean{
reverting process with transition probability Ã, as described in Appendix C of Shimer (2005b).
The two parameters (zmin;Ã) are set to target a quarterly standard deviation and autocorrelation
of labor productivity around trend of 0.02 and 0.85. Starting from a stationary ¯rm distribution,
we simulate the evolution of these ¯rms over 2000 months, using the policy functions from the
numerical solution of (18) and (19). In every simulation period, the number of ¯rm entrants is
obtained as a residual of the economy's resource constraint. We compare two calibrations. In
the ¯rst, the entry cost K does not vary with aggregate productivity. With this speci¯cation,
¯rm entry turns out to be more than 10 times as volatile as in the data. Therefore, we consider a
second calibration where the entry costs are allowed to vary procyclically to match the empirical
standard deviation of job creation at opening ¯rms.32 To match this target, we set the elasticity
of K with respect to z to 0.44.
Table 4 shows the outcome of this exercise for volatility and comovement with aggregate
output. For both calibrations, the model clearly has too low ampli¯cation: all labor market
variables are less volatile than in the data, as is the case in Shimer's (2005b) calibration of
the search and matching model with homogeneous (constant return) ¯rms and socially e±cient
job creation. One way to understand low ampli¯cation is the gap between productivity and the
opportunity cost of work; the larger this gap is, the smaller should be the response of job creation
to productivity shocks (see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Hall and Milgrom (2008)). In fact,
with productivity.
31Equation (21) implies that ¸ is a function of the aggregate state ¹i alone if marginal vacancy costs are
constant.
32There are many possibilities why entry costs vary with the business cycle, e.g. procyclical rental rates or
capital prices. In our framework, entry costs would be procyclical if ¯rms are created by entrepreneurs whose
opportunity costs (e.g. market work) are higher in upswings.











Figure 5: Impulse response to a permanent 1% increase in aggregate labor productivity. The
graphs show the average response of 600 simulated model responses where each simulation starts
from a cross{section of 4 ¢ 105 ¯rms.
in our calibration, aggregate labor productivity (which is obviously identical to the employment{
weighted average product of labor across ¯rms) is 0.45 and the employment{weighted marginal
product is 0.315, so that the opportunity cost of work (parameter b) is just 44% of average
product and 66% of marginal product. When we double parameter b to 0.4 (and adjust the
operating cost to f = 0:19 so as to make sure that again only ¯rms with x = xmin leave the
market), average ¯rm size falls, the average and marginal products of labor increase (albeit by
a factor less than two), so that b is at 55% of average product and at 78% of marginal product.
In the calibration with variable entry costs, the relative volatility of the vacancy{unemployment
ratio nearly doubles (from 1.2 to 2.1). In alternative search and matching models with large
¯rms and intra{¯rm bargaining, Krause and Lubik (2007) and Faccini and Ortigueira (2010)
also ¯nd little ampli¯cation of neutral technology shocks, whereas Elsby and Michaels (2010)
34obtain more volatility. Their models di®er from ours in several dimensions. Which of those is
the reason for the variation between the results remains the subject of future research.
Despite low ampli¯cation, our model generates a correlation pattern with aggregate output
which is consistent with the data. On the one hand, the model captures a downward{sloping
Beveridge curve, that is, a strong negative comovement of unemployment and vacancies. This
is despite the feature that job destruction is endogenous in this model. On the other hand, in
the calibration with procyclical entry costs, the job{¯nding rate is strongly procyclical and more
volatile than the separation rate which correlates negatively with output.
Table 4: Business cycle statistics
Data Model (Fixed Model (Variable
entry cost) entry cost)
Relative Corr. Relative Corr. Relative Corr.
volatility w. output volatility w. output volatility w. output
Productivity 0.764 0.686 0.969 0.999 0.964 0.999
Unemployment rate 7.665 -0.888 0.948 -0.464 0.544 -0.918
Vacancies 7.333 0.762 1.016 0.949 0.715 0.984
Job{¯nding rate 4.398 0.819 0.568 0.842 0.446 0.995
Separation rate 2.685 -0.646 0.537 0.051 0.104 -0.252
Notes: All variables are logged and HP ¯ltered with parameter 105. Relative volatility measures the stan-
dard deviation of a variable divided by the standard deviation of output. Data are for the U.S. labor market
(1948Q1{2007Q1, Vacancies: 1951Q1{2006Q3); the job{¯nding rate and separation rate series were constructed
by Robert Shimer (see Shimer (2007) and his webpage http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/°ows).
The model statistics are obtained from a simulation of 4 ¢ 105 ¯rms over a period of 2000 months where the ¯rst
40 months are discarded. Monthly series are converted into quarterly series by time averaging.
6 Conclusion
The introduction of multi{worker ¯rms into labor{search models bridges the separate literatures
on ¯rm dynamics and labor market frictions. It has the potential to address issues in both ¯elds,
and most importantly to create new insights into the interplay between ¯rm heterogeneity, worker
and job °ows, and the levels and °uctuations in employment. This particular project proposes a
wage formation process for such environments that incorporates standard competitive elements
adjusted for the fact that search frictions prevent perfect market clearing. The model turns out
to be tractable, it matches several stylized facts regarding ¯rm growth, pay and recruitment
35strategies, and it implements socially e±cient allocations both in and out of steady state. It can
be viewed as a benchmark against which to judge actual labor market allocations.
To conclude, it is worthwhile to note that this framework is °exible for extensions. On the
one hand, it is easy to allow for variable capital investment, as long as the ¯rm{level production
functions retain decreasing returns in all variable inputs. On the other hand, it is straightforward
to introduce worker heterogeneity provided that vacancies are speci¯c to the type of worker that
the ¯rm searches for.33 An extension along this line would yield insights into the sorting of
di®erent worker types across heterogeneous ¯rms and the interactions between the employment
dynamics of di®erent worker types. Another interesting extension concerns the emergence of
endogenous worker heterogeneity due to on{the{job learning. When workers build up human
capital on the job, ¯rms (and the planner) are no longer indi®erent between ¯ring workers with
longer or with shorter job tenure, as they are in this paper. Workers hired in later stages of a
¯rm's life must then be compensated for the higher risk of job loss in the event of a downturn.
A further extension is to allow for risk aversion and incomplete markets in our framework. In
constant{return environments with exogenous separation rates, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a)
and Rudanko (2010) introduce long{term contracting and analyze the implications for risk shar-
ing, unemployment insurance and labor market dynamics. Our model with exogenous separa-
tions could also be augmented along these lines. If workers are risk averse and have no access
to capital markets, risk neutral ¯rms o®er °at wage contracts. Similar to our exposition in
Section 3, ¯rms solve a recursive problem subject to a workers' participation constraint which
takes into account u(w) instead of w. But di®erent from our results, equilibrium ceases to be
socially e±cient, provided that the planner is allowed to redistribute income to the unemployed.
Lack of unemployment insurance induces workers to search too much for low{paying but easy{
to{get jobs (as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a)), and should lead to excess employment in
low{productivity ¯rms and therefore to a misallocation of labor between heterogeneous ¯rms.
Overall, the current setup still provides the relevant benchmark: if perfect risk sharing is avail-
able, workers care only about expected income values as analyzed in this paper and competitive
search equilibrium achieves socially e±cient ¯rm dynamics.
33Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2008) analyze such a model with random search and bargaining.
36Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that our cost function ful¯lls the conditions C1 > 0, C11 > 0,
C12 · 0, and C13 ¸ 0, and that xF(L) ¡ C(V;L;x) is concave in (V;L) and supermodular in
(L;x). Additional requirements that are listed in Lemma 2 below are also satis¯ed for our cost
function.
The observation that the ¯rm's objective and constraints in problem (3) are separable
in L and W and linear in W suggests that the value function takes the form Jx(L;W) =
¡BW + G(L;x;½) for some constant B > 0. The envelope condition with respect to W yields
B = 1 + ¯(1 ¡ ´)B ; (33)
which implies B = 1=[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)]. Further, G(L;x;½) satis¯es the recursive problem
G(L;x;½) = max
(¸;V )¸0
xF(L) ¡ C(V;L;x) ¡ ¯[¸½ + (1 ¡ ±)Bm(¸)R(½)]V + ¯(1 ¡ ±)G(^ L;x;½)
s.t. ^ L = L(1 ¡ s) + m(¸)V ; V ¸ 0; (34)
where R(½) makes explicit that the reservation value R depends on ½ via (1). This problem is
equivalently de¯ned on a compact state space L 2 [0;L] where L is so large that it never binds.
This is possible because of the Inada condition limL!1 F 0(L) = 0. The RHS in problem (34)
de¯nes an operator T which maps a continuous function G0(L;x;½), de¯ned on [0;L]£[0;x]£[0;½]
into a continuous function G1(L;x;½) = T(G0)(L;x;½) de¯ned on the same domain. This
operator is a contraction and it maps functions which are increasing in L and x and decreasing
in ½ into functions with the same property. Moreover, the ¯xed point must be decreasing in
½ and strictly increasing in x, which follows from di®erentiation of G with respect to ½ and
x. Di®erentiability follows from straightforward application of the approach by Benveniste and
Scheinkman.
To prove concavity and supermodularity of the value function, we rewrite (34) in terms of
hirings H = m(¸)V , noting that for a given level of hiring only the second and third term on the
right hand side of (34) depend on the remaining choice variables and capture the hiring costs.
Dropping argument ½ from G, we can equivalently write (34) as
G(L;x) = max
H













As will become clear, the per period return xF(L) ¡ C(H;L;x) is supermodular in (L;H) but
for h > 0 (which implies C13 > 0) strictly submodular in (H;x) and in (^ L;x) when one writes
37H = ^ L ¡ (1 ¡ s)L, which renders standard tools to prove supermodularity (e.g., Amir (1996))

















































dH ¸ 0 : (40)
Therefore, we can express the derivatives of cost function C as
C1 = ¯½
m
0(¸) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)BR ;















dL · 0 ; (42)




















C12 ¸ 0 ; (44)











Lemma 1: The recursive problem (35) de¯nes a value function G(L;x) which is




00 ¡ C22] · 0 : (46)
(b) supermodular in (x;L) if the following condition holds:
C12C13 + C11[F
0 ¡ C23] ¸ 0 : (47)
38Lemma 2:




00 ¡ C22] · 0 : (48)
(b) Condition (47) holds under the following condition on the original cost function C:
C12C13 + C11[F
0 ¡ C23] ¸ 0 : (49)
Proof of Lemma 1: Write (35) as G(L;x) = (TG)(L;x) where T is an operator mapping
continuous functions on [0;L]£R+ into another continuous function on the same domain, which
has the same properties as the one described above.
Part (a). Suppose that G is a concave function of L, and di®erentiate TG twice with respect





00 ¡ C22 + ¯(1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ s)G11 +
h




Di®erentiate the FOC C1 = ¯(1 ¡ ±)G1 with respect to L to obtain
dH
dL = ¯(1 ¡ ´)G11 ¡ C12
C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
: (51)





00 ¡ C22 + ¯(1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ s)G11C11 + C
2
12 ¡ 2¯(1 ¡ ´)G11C12
C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
:
In the last term, the denominator is positive and larger than C11. In the numerator, all terms











which is non{positive under (46). Hence, T maps a concave function into a concave function,
and therefore the unique ¯xed point is concave.
Part (b). Suppose that G is a supermodular function of (L;x), and di®erentiate TG twice




0 ¡ C23 + ¯(1 ¡ ´)G12 +
h




Di®erentiate the FOC C1 = ¯(1 ¡ ±)G1 with respect to x to obtain
dH
dx = ¯(1 ¡ ±)G12 ¡ C13
C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
: (53)




0 ¡ C23 + ¯(1 ¡ ´)G12C11 + C12C13 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G12C12 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)G11C13
C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
:
In the last term, the denominator is positive and larger than C11. In the numerator, all terms





0 ¡ C23 + C12C13
C11
;
which is non{negative under (46). Hence, T maps a supermodular function into a supermodular
function, and therefore the unique ¯xed point is supermodular. 2
Proof of Lemma 2:











Because of C11 > 0, C12 · 0 and C12 · 0, this condition is equivalent to (48).









Because of C11 > 0, C12 · 0 and C12 · 0, this condition is equivalent to (49). 2
It follows from Lemma 1 and 2 that the value function G(L;x) is concave in L and super-
modular in (L;x) because our cost function satis¯es both (48) and (49).
Because of strict concavity of problem (34), policy functions ¸x(L) and V x(L;¸x(L)) exist.
To derive (4) and (5), consider the ¯rst{order conditions for problem (34) with respect to V and
¸,
C1(V;L;x) ¸ ¯(1 ¡ ±)
n
m(¸)G1(^ L;x) ¡ B
h
¸½1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)
1 ¡ ± + m(¸)R
io
; V ¸ 0 ; (54)
0 ¸ m
0(¸)V G1(^ L;x) ¡
h
½1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)
1 ¡ ± + m
0(¸)R
i
V B ; ¸ ¸ 0; (55)
which are both satis¯ed with complementary slackness. The envelope condition for problem (34)
is
G1(L;x) = xF
0(L) ¡ C2(V;L;x) + ¯(1 ¡ ´)G1(^ L;x) ; (56)
It is without loss of generality to impose (55) as equality,34 and substituting it into (54) and
using (33) directly yields the complementary{slackness condition (4). Condition (5) follows
immediately from (55) and (56).
34If V is zero then (55) trivially holds with equality. If V > 0 then (54) implies ¸ > 0 and again (55) has to
hold with equality.












+ ¯(1 ¡ ´)G11 ¡ C12









C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
;
the term in [:] is negative, and so is d¸x=(dL).












+ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G12 ¡ C13









C11 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)G11
;
the term in [:] is positive, and so is d¸x=(dx). 2
Proof of Corollary 2: Because of exogenous separations, the growth rate of a ¯rm,




























In this expression, the ¯rst and the third term are strictly positive. The second term is zero
when h = 0, and negative but small if h is small. Thus, dJCR=(dx) is positive if h is su±ciently
small.

























In this expression, the ¯rst, the third and the fourth term are strictly negative. The second term
is zero when h = 0, and positive but small if h is small. Thus, dJCR=(dL) is negative if h is
su±ciently small. 2
Lemma 3: Equation (7) has a unique steady state solution ¸¤ > 0 if, and only if,
h < ¯(1 ¡ ±)m
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´) ; (57)
41with m = lim¸!1 m(¸)¡¸m0(¸) > 0. Under this condition, any sequence ¸t > 0 satisfying this
equation converges to ¸¤.
Proof of Lemma 3: A steady state ¸¤ must satisfy the condition
¯½[m(¸) ¡ ¸m
0(¸)] = ½h[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´)]
1 ¡ ± + [Rh + c]m
0(¸) : (58)
The LHS is strictly increasing and goes from 0 to ¯½m as ¸ goes from 0 to +1. The RHS is
decreasing in ¸ with limit ½h(1¡¯(1¡´))=(1¡±) for ¸ ! 1. Hence, a unique steady state ¸¤








¤) + h¯(1 ¡ ´) ;
which is positive and smaller than one i®
h < ¯(1 ¡ ±)m(¸
¤)
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´) :













< ¯(1 ¡ ±)m(¸
¤)
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ´) :
Therefore, the steady state ¸¤ is locally stable. Moreover, equation (7) de¯nes a continuous,
increasing relation between ¸t+1 and ¸t which has only one intersection with the 45{degree line.
Hence, ¸t+1 > ¸t for any ¸t < ¸¤ and ¸t+1 < ¸t for any ¸t > ¸¤, which implies that ¸t converges
to ¸¤ from any initial value ¸¿ > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
It remains to prove existence and uniqueness. From Proposition 1 follows that the entrant's








is a decreasing and continuous function of ½. Moreover, the function is strictly decreasing in
½ whenever it is positive. This also follows from the proof of Proposition 1 which shows that
G(0;x;½) is strictly decreasing in ½ when the new ¯rm x recruits workers (V x(0;¸) > 0). If no
new ¯rm recruits workers, expected pro¯t of an entrant cannot be positive. Hence, equation (8)
can have at most one solution for any K > 0. This implies uniqueness, with entry of ¯rms if (8)
can be ful¯lled or without entry of ¯rms otherwise. A solution to (8) exists provided that K is
su±ciently small and F 0(0) is su±ciently large. To see this, if F 0(0) is su±ciently large, ¦¤(0) is
42strictly positive: some entrants will recruit workers since the marginal product G1(m(¸)V;x;½)
is su±ciently large relative to the cost of recruitment and relative to the wage cost which are,
for ½ = 0, equal to m(¸)V b (see equation (34)). But when ¦¤(0) > 0, a su±ciently small value
of K guarantees that (8) has a solution since lim½!1 ¦¤(½) = 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
We will show that the ¯rst-order conditions that uniquely characterize the decentralized
allocation are also ¯rst order conditions to the planner's problem. The same auxiliary problem
that we employ in the proof of Proposition 4 part (b) then establishes that the planner cannot
improve upon this allocation. We denote by SN;a the derivative of S with respect to Na and by
SL;a;x the derivative of S with respect to Lx
a. The multiplier on the resource constraint is ¹ ¸ 0.
First{order conditions with respect to N0, V x
a , and ¸x





























a) · 0 ; V
x




a) ¡ ¹Na¼(x) = 0 : (61)
Here condition (60) holds with complementary slackness. The envelope conditions are, for a ¸ 1












a;x) ¡ b ¡ ¹
i





























+ ¯(1 ¡ ±)SN;a+1 : (63)






















This equation describes the planner's optimal recruitment policy; it coincides with equation
(5) for ¹ = R ¡ b = ¯½. This is intuitive: when the social value of an unemployed worker ¹
coincides with the surplus value that an unemployed worker obtains in search equilibrium, the
¯rm's recruitment policy is e±cient. Next substitute (61) into (60) to obtain the socially optimal


















a ¸ 0 : (64)
Again for ¹ = ¯½, this condition coincides with the ¯rm's choice of vacancy postings in compet-
itive search equilibrium, equation (4). Lastly, it remains to verify that entry is socially e±cient
43when the value of a jobless worker is ¹ = R ¡ b. The planner's choice of ¯rm entry, condition


















































Hence, the free{entry condition in search equilibrium, equation (8), coincides with condition (65)
















= 0 : (66)




























into (66), it is straightforward to see that the equation is satis¯ed for ¹ = R ¡ b = ¯½. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
Part (a): The RHS in the system of equations in (16) de¯nes an operator T which maps
a sequence of bounded functions G = (Gt)t¸0, with Gt : [0;L] £ X £ Zt ! IR such that
kGk ´ supt kGtk < 1, into another sequence of bounded functions ~ G = ( ~ Gt)t¸0 with k ~ Gk =
supt k ~ Gtk < 1. Here L is su±ciently large such that the bound ^ L · L does not bind for any
L 2 [0;L]. The existence of L follows from the Inada condition for F: the marginal product
of an additional worker xzF 0(^ L) ¡ b must be negative for any x 2 X, z 2 Z, for any ^ L ¸ L
with su±ciently large L; hence no hiring will occur beyond L. Because the operator satis¯es
Blackwell's su±cient conditions, it is a contraction in the space of bounded function sequences
G. Hence, the operator T has a unique ¯xed point which is a sequence of bounded functions.
Part (b): Take ¯rst a solution X of the planning problem, and write ¯tÃ(zt)¹(zt) ¸ 0 for the







































44For each individual ¯rm, this problem is the sequential formulation of the recursive problem (16)
with multipliers ¹(zt). Hence, ¯rm policies also solve the recursive problem; furthermore, the
maximum of the Lagrange function is the same as the sum of the social values of entrant ¯rms



























This also proves that the complementary{slackness condition (17) describes optimal entry.
To prove the converse, suppose that X solves for every ¯rm the recursive problem (16) with
multipliers ¹(zt), and that (17) and the resource constraints (15) are satis¯ed. De¯ne an auxiliary
problem (AP) as an extension of the original planning problem (14) which allows the planner to
rent additional workers (or to rent out existing workers) at rental rate ¹(zt) in period t. Formally,

















with M(zt) ¡ 1 > 0 workers hired or M(zt) ¡ 1 < 0 workers hired out. Further, the rental
cost (rental income) term ¡¹(zt)[M(zt) ¡ 1] is added into the braces in the objective function
(14). Then it follows immediately that the multiplier on constraint (67) is equal to ¹(zt). We
further claim that allocation X solves problem (AP), and hence also solves the original planning
problem. To see this, suppose that there is an allocation (X0;M) which is feasible for problem












for the net output created by ¯rm (xa;zt) in allocation X and write O0(xa;zt) for the same
object in allocation X0. Further, write S for the total surplus value in allocation (X;1) and































































































































t) = S :
Here the ¯rst inequality follows from resource constraint (67). The second inequality follows























is bounded above Gt(0;x0;zt) (for new ¯rms) or by G0(L(xa¡1;:);xa;z0) (for ¯rms existing
at t = 0) by de¯nition of Gt. The third inequality follows from the complementary{slackness
condition (17): either the term ¡K+
P
x ¼0(x)Gt(0;x;zt) is zero in which case the ¯rst summand
is zero on both sides of the inequality; or it is strictly negative in which case N0(zt) = 0 and
N0
0(zt) ¸ 0. The last equality follows from the de¯nition of surplus value S and the assumption
that allocation X solves problem (16) at the level of each individual ¯rm. This proves S0 · S
and hence contradicts the hypothesis S0 > S. 2
Proof of Proposition 5:
Part (a): For the multipliers de¯ned by ¹(zt) = ¹i for zt = zi, the unique solution of (16)
coincides with the one of (18), i.e. Gt(L;x;zt) = Gi(L;x;¹) for zt = zi, and also the ¯rm{level
policies coincide. If they give rise to an allocation X with positive entry in all aggregate states
zt, (19) implies that (17) holds for all zt. Hence Proposition 4(b) implies that X is a solution of
the planning problem.
Part (b): Solving (18) in the stationary case involves to ¯nd a single value function G(L;x;¹).
Application of the contraction mapping theorem implies that such a solution exits, is unique,
and is continuous and non{increasing in ¹ and strictly decreasing in ¹ when G(:) > 0.
Therefore, the function ¡(¹) ´
P
x ¼0(x)G(0;x;¹) ¸ 0 is continuous, strictly decreasing
when positive, and zero for large enough ¹. Furthermore, when f and b are su±ciently small,
¡(0) > 0; hence when K > 0 is su±ciently small, there exists a unique ¹ ¸ 0 satisfying equation
(19).
For any given vector (¹1;:::;¹n) 2 Rn
+, the system of recursive equations (18) has a unique
solution G = (Gi). Again this follows from the application of the contraction{mapping theorem.
46Furthermore, G is di®erentiable in ¹, and all elements of the Jacobian (dGi=(d¹j)) are non{
positive. The RHS of (18) de¯nes an operator mapping a function Gi(L;x;¹) with a strictly
diagonally dominant Jacobian matrix (dGi=(d¹j)) into another function ~ Gj whose Jacobian
matrix (d ~ Gi=(d¹j)) is diagonally dominant. This follows since the transition matrix Ã(zjjzi) is
strictly diagonally dominant and since all elements of (d ~ Gi=(d¹j)) have the same (non{positive)
sign. Therefore, the unique ¯xed point has a strictly diagonally dominant Jacobian. Now suppose
that (z1;:::;zn) is close to (z;:::;z) and consider the solution ¹1 = ::: = ¹n = ¹ from part (a).
Since the Jacobian matrix dGi(0;x;¹)=(d¹j) is strictly diagonally dominant, it is invertible. By
the implicit function theorem, a unique solution to equation (19) exits. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof proceeds in two steps. First, substitute the participation
constraint (30) into the ¯rm's problem and make use of the contracts' recursive equations (23)
to show that the ¯rms' recursive pro¯t maximization problem is identical to the maximization of
the social surplus of a ¯rm. Second, show that the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal.
First, de¯ne the social surplus of a ¯rm with history (xa;zt) and with predetermined contracts
































Using (23) with 'a(xa;zt) = 0 and the participation constraint (30), the wage in the hiring
period can be expressed as
wa(x
a;z



































































































xaztF(^ L) ¡ f ¡ C(V;L;x) ¡ ½(z
t)
h






Here maximization is subject to (27) and (28), and the second equation makes use of (25).
This shows that the ¯rm solves a surplus maximization problem which is identical to the one
of the planner speci¯ed in (16) provided that ½(zt) = ¹(zt) holds for all zt, where ¹ is the
social value of an unemployed worker as de¯ned in section 4.2. The only di®erence between the
two problems is that the ¯rm commits to cohort{speci¯c separation probabilities, whereas the
planner chooses in every period an identical separation probability for all workers (and he clearly
has no reason to do otherwise). Nonetheless, both problems have the same solution: they are
dynamic optimization problems of a single decision maker in which payo® functions are the same
(with ½(zt) = ¹(zt)) and the decision sets are the same. Further, time inconsistency is not an
issue since there is no strategic interaction and since discounting is exponential. Hence solutions
to the two problems, with respect to ¯rm exit, layo®s and hiring strategies, are identical. In both
problems the decision maker could discriminate between di®erent cohorts in principal. Because
such di®erential treatment does not raise social ¯rm value, there is also no reason for competitive
search to produce such an outcome. Nonetheless, there can be equilibria where di®erent cohorts
have di®erent separation probabilities, but these equilibria must also be socially optimal because
they maximize social ¯rm value.
It remains to verify that competitive search gives indeed rise to socially e±cient ¯rm en-
try. When ¹(zt) = ½(zt), G0(x;zt) as de¯ned in (68) coincides with G0(0;x;zt), as de¯ned in
(16). Hence, the free{entry condition (31) coincides with the condition for socially optimal ¯rm
creation (17). Because of aggregate resource feasibility (32), the planner's resource constraint
(15) is also satis¯ed. Since the allocation of a competitive search equilibrium satis¯es all the
requirements of Proposition 4(b), it is socially optimal. 2
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